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but it will not assume the girl is naive simply because she is under-
age. 44 if the girl gives the appearance that she is over the age of con-
sent and if the defendant had a reasonable bona fide belief that she
was overage, the California court holds the accused is not guilty be-
cause a reasonable mistake of age will negate intent. This view is
similar to that adopted by the Model Penal Code.
4 5
The American courts have used two rationales to arrive at the re-
sult that a mistake as to the age of the female is no defense to the crime
of statutory rape. The first rationale, strict liability, is not a proper
approach because general intent is excluded as an element of the
crime. The second view recognizes that general intent is necessary,
but a mistake of age does not negate this intent. The necessary gen-
eral intent is established by the fact that the defendant intended to do
something wrong. While the second rationale is a proper approach, it
is submitted that the results of this rationale should be reconsidered in
those jurisdictions where fornication is not a crime and where the




In most states municipal corporations are generally immune from
tort liability. Even when these corporations are liable, either because
the immunity has been abolished or the tort was committed in con-
nection with a proprietary activity, damages are limited to those which
are compensatory. Punitive damages cannot be recovered.
In a recent Florida case, Fisher v. City of Miami,1 the plaintiff
was arrested by a police officer of the defendant city. While making the
""The assumption that age alone will bring an understanding of the sexual act
to a young woman is of doubtful validity." People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361,
362, 393 P.2d 673, 674 (1964).
"'"Mistake as to Age. Whenever in this article the criminality of conduct de-
pends on a child's being below the age of io, it is no defense that the actor did
not know the child's age, or reasonably believed the child to be older than io. When
criminality depends on the child's being below a critical age other than io, it is
a defense for the actor to prove that he reasonably believed the child to be above
the critical age." Model Penal Code § 213-6(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
',6o So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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arrest the officer assaulted Fisher, who sued Miami for both compen-
satory and punitive damages. After striking the prayer for punitive
damages, the lower court granted summary judgment for the defen-
dant, stating that the city could not be held liable for the intentional
torts of its agents. The District Court of Appeals reversed the summary
judgment,2 but affirmed the striking of the prayer for punitive dam-
ages. The court said that allowance of punitive damages against the
city would serve no useful purpose. One judge dissented, contending
that the propriety of granting punitive damages against a munici-
pal corporation had been decided in the affirmative by the Florida
Supreme Court.
3
In 1788 the English Court of King's Bench decided Russel v. Men
of Devon,4 the case generally considered to have initiated the doc-
trine of municipal immunity from tort liability.5 This case has been
misapplied and misinterpreted by the courts.6 As cities grew the attacks
on the doctrine grew with them.7 Yielding to the pressure for reform,
some courts began holding that a city would be immune from lia-
bility only if it were engaged in a governmental function, as opposed to
-Simpson v. City of Miami, 155 So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), held
that a municipal corporation could be liable for the intentional torts of its
police officers, when in the scope of their employment. On this basis the court in
the Fisher case held that the City of Miami could be liable for compensatory
damages.
3In City of Miami v. McCorkle, 145 Fla. 109, 199 So. 575 (9-si), the plaintiff
sued the defendant for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when the City's fire
truck struck the car in which McCorkle was a passenger. On the question of
punitive damages the court said that when an employee of the municipality so
negligently and carelessly operated the fire truck as to endanger the public then
the municipality would be held to the same degree of liability as would an indiv-
vidual under similar circumstances. It held that punitive damages would have been
proper but that the jury verdict did not indicate that they had been assessed.
"2 T.R. 667, too Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
5Molitor v. Kaneland Community, iS Ill. 2d it, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Holytz
v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 6i8 (1962); Borchard, Govern-
ment Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 129 (1925).
cThe Russel case was based on the theory that the King could do no wrong.
Also the plaintiff was attempting to sue an unincorporated changing body of
men. In papers which have still not been published the late Dean Roscoe Pound is
said to have rebelled "against survival in our society of the idea that the king can
do no wrong. We have no king...." Sutherland, One Man in His Time, 78 Harv.
L. Rev. 7, 22 (1964). Today the corporation itself is amenable to suit.
7Lynwood v. Decatur Park Dist., 26 Ill. App. 2d 431, 168 N.E.2d 185 (1966);
Erickson v. Fitzgerald, 342 Ill. App. 223, 96 N.E.2d 382 (195o); Fowler v. City of
Cleveland, too Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 ('919); Britten v. City of Eau Claire, 26o
Wis. 382, 51 N.W.2d 3o (1952); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4
Ill. L.Q. 28 (1921).
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a proprietary function, at the time the tort was committed.8 While
applying the governmental-proprietary function test, other courts ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the whole immunity doctrine but declined
to act, saying that such action must come from the legislature.9 In
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,10 the Florida court refused to
pass the problem on to the legislature and abolished the doctrine.
Other states followed the lead, and now the immunity doctrine has
been abrogated or restricted by the courts or legislatures of a number
of states1 1 in addition to Florida.
12
If a municipality can be sued, either because it no longer enjoys
immunity or it was engaged in a proprietary function at the time the
tort was committed, then the problem of punitive damages arises. A
majority of the states do allow punitive damages against nongovern-
mental defendants.' 3 These damages have been awarded for unusually
8Imperial Prod. Co. v. City of Sweetwater, 21o F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1954); Day v.
City of Berlin, 157 F.Rd 323 (ist Cir. 1946); Splinter v. City of Nampa, 215 P.2d
999 (Idaho 1950); Gravander v. City of Chicago, 399 Ill. 381, 78 N.E.2d 304
(1948); Reierson v. City of Minneapolis, i18 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1962); Heitman v.
Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18 (1947).
OLee V. Dunklee, 84 Ariz. 260, 326 P.2d 1117 (1958); Yonker v. City of San
Gabriel, 23 Cal. App. 2d 556, 73 P.2d 623 (1937); Phillips v. State Highway Comm'n,
148 Kan. 702, 84 P.2d 927 (1939); Schuster v. City of New York, 207 Misc. 1102,
121 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Mason v. City of Cincinnati, 12o N.E.2d 740
(Ohio Ct. App. 1951); Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219, 55 N.W.2d
24 (1952) (concurring opinion).
1096 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
"City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 2o (Alaska 1962); Muskopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community,
supra note 5; Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (ig6i); Mc-
Corkell v. City of Northfield, 123 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 1963); Holytz v. City of Mil-
waukee, supra note 5; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:51:3 (Cum. Supp. 1963) (requires that the
city purchase insurance to protect itself from tort suits growing out of some govern-
mental functions); N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 50 (1954) (imposing liability on cities
for torts committed while the city was engaged in some governmental functions such
as the operation of motor vehicles.)
"T'rhe Florida case in which the immunity doctrine was abrogated involved
negligent torts of city employees. The cases supra note ii are valid precedents for
negligent torts but the rationale applied in them would seem to apply equally
to the field of intentional torts. In City of Miami Beach v. Nye, 156 So. 2d 205
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), it was held that municipal liability would be applied
to cases involving intentional torts.
U'For a list of states accepting or rejecting the doctrine of punitive damages,
see Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property, § 269 at p. 540 (rev. ed. 1962). Some
states which recognize punitive damages allow them as multiple damages, and
others as part of the compensatory damages. Still other states require that there be
at least nominal damages before punitive damages will be permitted. The punitive
damages are ,not awarded as a matter of right but in the discretion of the court.
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oppressive conduct, 14 such as assault,15 false imprisonment, 6 libel and
slander,'7 nuisance,s and seduction.' 9 In some cases in which punitive
damages have been assessed against a private corporation, restrictions
are applied to the assessment. 20 In others a simple rule of respondeat
superior is applied.
21
Almost without exception American jurisdictions still refuse to
award punitive damages against municipal corporations. 22 An impor-
tant reason is that to do so would contravene public policy.28 Public
money would be spent but the actual wrongdoer would not be pun-
ished. Another reason is the difficulty in determining the amount of
""'The 'rule of law' which is supposed to determine whether the case is an
appropriate one for the allowance of punitive damages provides that they can
be given only if it is found that the defendant has been 'reckless,' 'wanton,' 'op-
pressive,' 'wilful,' and the like." Morris, Punative Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 1173, 1190 (1931).
2 Thompson v. Johnson, i8o F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 195o); Vanneman v. W. T.
Grant Co., 351 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. 1961); Trogden v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 9o S.E. 583
(1916); Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 1o4 S.E. 8oo (i92o); Peck v. Bez, 129
W. Va. 247, 40 S.E.2d 1 (1946).
"Johnson v. Enlow, 286 P.2d 630 (Colo. 1955); Dennis v. Baltimore Transit
Co., 189 Md. 61o, 56 A.2d 813 (1948); Snyder v. State, 236 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Ct. CI. 1963).
"Roden v. Empire Printing Co., 135 F. Supp. 665 (D. Alaska 1955); Edwards
v. Hines, 85 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1948); Shumate v. Johnson Publishing Co., 293
P.2d 531 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Loftsgaarden v. Reeling, 126 N.W.2d 154 (Minn.
1964); Brooks v. MacBeth, 149 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
"Mclvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946); South-
land Co. v. Aaron, 8o So. 2d 823 (Miss. 1955); Laurel Equip. Co. v. Matthews, 67
So. ad 258 (Miss. 1953); Yazoo & M. Valley R.R. v. Saunders, 87 Miss. 6o7, 40
So. 163 (1906).
"Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 20o (1917); Guadagno v.
Folco, 62 R.I. 404, 6 A.2d 450 (1939); Caccamisi v. Thurmond, a82 S.W.2d 633
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1955); Bishop v. Webster, 154 Va. 771, 153 S.E. 832 (1930).
m'Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893) (holding that the
acts of the employee must have been authorized or ratified by the employer);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Aldridge, 66 F.2d 26 (9 th Cir. 1933) (holding that the
employer must have been negligent in the hiring of the employee or have known
that he was incompetent); Cleghorn v. New York Central & H.R.R., 56 N.Y. 44
(1874) (holding that the employer must have known that the employee was unfit
for the position); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Wynne, 149 Va. 882, 141 S.E.
829 (1928) (allowing punitive damages on a showing that the employer did ratify
the acts of the employee).
"Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948); American Fid. & Cas.
Co. v. Farmer, 77 Ga. App. 166, 48 S.E.2d 122 (1948); Hayes v. Southern Ry., 141
N.C. 195, 53 S.E. 847 (19o6); Beauchamp v. Winnsboro Granite Corp., 113 S.C. 522,
io S.E. 856 (ig2o).
2For cases so holding see Annot., 19 A.L.R.d 903, goS (1951). This majority
includes states which still maintain the immunity doctrine and those which have
abolished it.
,'Town of Newton v. Wilson, 128 Miss. 726, 91 So. 419 (1922); Brown v. Village
of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 6o9 (1952); Board of Comm'rs v. Baxter, 113 Okla.
280, 241 Pac. 752 (1925).
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damages to be assessed. The jury may look to the wealth of the de-
fendant in determining the proper amount of punitive damages, 24 and
courts fear that the jury, looking to the wealth of municipalities, will
return enormous verdicts of punitive damages.25 Still another rationale
is that, if punitive damages are to be permitted against the municipal-
ities, the authority for such action must come from the legislature.2 6
Notwithstanding the majority view to the contrary, a few courts
have either actually or impliedly authorized the assessment of punitive
damages against municipal corporations. The courts in these cases did
not concern themselves with municipal immunity, apparently as-
suming that the cities were engaged in proprietary functions and thus
liable for their actions. Most of the cases have involved the operation
of water and sewage systems. In Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau,27 the
defendant was held liable for both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. A judgment had been rendered declaring that the overflow of
the gutters maintained by the city was a nuisance. The action of the
city was described as "the intentional creation of a condition by
appellant.., declared to be a nuisance, and the intentional contin-
uance of that nuisance to the respondent's injury without legal justifi-
cation."28 The court said that such action was "malice at law" and it
justified the award of punitive damages. A similar case which im-
plied that punitive damages could be assessed against a city was
City of Covington v. Faulhaber.2 9 The plaintiff sued the city after
"A recognized principle of law is that the jury may receive evidence as to
the wealth of the defendant in order to assess proper punitive damages. The prin-
ciple is based on the theory that an amount sufficient to punish a poor man might
have little or no effect on a wealthy man or corporation. Maiborne v. Kuntz, 56 So.
2d 720 (Fla. 1952).
2"The danger... of immoderate verdicts, is certainly a real one, and the
criterion to be applied by the judge in setting aside or reducing the amount is
concededly a vague and subjective one. Nevertheless the verdict may be twice
submitted by the complaining defendant to the common sense of trained judicial
minds, ... and it must be a rare instance when an unjustifiable award escapes
correction." McCormick, Damages § 77 at p. 278 (1935). In the recent libel case
of Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ga. 1964), the trial
judge reduced the punitive damages by well over two million dollars. Such a
practice of reducing excessive punitive damages has been upheld. Virginian Ry.
v. Armentrout, 66 F.zd 400 (4th Cir. 1948), holding that the judge had the right
and the duty to either reduce or set aside an excessive verdict.
O'Desforge v. City of West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N.V.2d 633 (1950);
Rascoe v. Town of Farmington, 62 N.M. 51, 304 P.2d 575 (1956); Clark v. City of
Greer, 98 S.E.2d 751 (S.C. 1957). The attitude of leaving the action to the legis-
lature is similar to that held by some courts in refusing to abrogate the tort im-
munity doctrine.
"89 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1935).
8Id. at 45.
W178 Ky. 586, 199 S.W. 32 (1917).
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its reservoir overflowed, damaging the plaintiff's property. It appeared
that the city had been negligent in failing to clean the reservoir
regularly. By its negligence a nuisance was created. The court said that
wanton and malicious conduct on the part of the defendant had to
be shown before plaintiff could recover punitive damages. The plain-
tiff could only show negligent conduct on the part of the city, so pun-
itive damages were not allowed.
In Willett v. City of St. Albans,30 a sewer operated by the defen-
dant overflowed onto the plaintiff's property. The court held that the
defendant could not be held liable for punitive damages under the
facts of this case. It said that, in order to recover punitive damages, the
plaintiff must show that the actions causing the overflow were ordered
or ratified by the trustees of the village. In the absence of such a
showing by the plaintiff no punitive damages were allowed. In City
of Lawton v. Johnstone,31 the defendant's sewerage damaged the
plaintiff's property. The plaintiff recovered compensatory and punitive
damages in the lower court. The Supreme Court said that the officers
of the city were the wrongdoers and the agents of the people. Using
an agency approach, the people as principals could be held liable to
the same degree as their agents. The court noted that the city had
not had time to correct the defect, so punitive damages would not yet
be appropriate. By way of dictum the court said that, if another case
arose against the city for the operation of the sewers, then punitive
damages might be appropriate.
In Armstrong & Latta v. City of Philadelphia,2 the plaintiffs sued
the city in replevin for some equipment belonging to the plaintiffs
and retained by the defendant, the city officers believing that it be-
longed to another contractor. In discussing the damages which could
be awarded the court said: "Exemplary damages may also be allowed
in cases where there have been particular circumstances of fraud, op-
pression, or wrong in the taking or the detention of the property.
'" 33
After so stating, the court concluded that no such circumstances had
been presented by the plaintiff and exemplary damages would not lie.
As courts look with more favor on the recovery of compensatory
damages against municipalities, the question will arise as to whether
they should go further and allow punitive damages. Admittedly a
municipal corporation is different from a private corporation in its
1069 Vt. 330, 38 Ad. 72 (1897).
31132 Okla. 145, 252 Pac. 393 (1926).
.249 Pa. 29, 94 At. 455 (1915).
3Id. at 457.
